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IN THE UTAH COUT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
ROBIN LANCE KAALOA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050790-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for murder, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004), and obstruction of justice, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (West 2004). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was counsel ineffective for impeaching a State's witness by eliciting 
evidence that the witness previously had spread baseless rumors about defendant 
murdering two girls? 
2. Was counsel ineffective for not objecting to the admission of (1) two 
photographs of the victim's body that showed no blood or injuries and (2) 
testimony from the medical examiner about the victim's decomposed body? 
3. Was counsel ineffective for not moving for a directed verdict despite 
evidence that defendant threatened to kill the victim and then beat him to death 
with a baseball bat and dumped his body on the side of a country road? 
4. Was counsel ineffective for not requesting a manslaughter instruction 
when there is no evidence that defendant wanted the jury to consider 
manslaughter? 
Standard of Review. "'Where, as here, a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is raised for the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it 
presents a question of law.'" State v. Atkin, 2006 UT App 155, \ 6, 550 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8 (quoting State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This appeal concerns, in part, trial counsel's decision not to object to evidence 
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count of murder and one count of 
obstructing justice for beating Jerry Coates to death with a baseball bat and 
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the side oi a country road (R. 1-9). After a two-day trial, a 
jury convicted defendant on both counts (R. 196; 294A:3-4). The court sentenced 
defendant to consecutive prison terms of five years to life and one to fifteen years 
(R. 249-50; 295:13). uetendant filed a timely notice oi j^pcai u ...•_ . ... - jp i -n ic 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
A , at at argument Lt....i 
LVfen. t K\U ^ '> - S KMV h- K M 1 h 
death with a baseball bat in a dispute over a truck (R. 294:103). The two met 
through mutual friends, Shelly and Roger Smith, with whom they used to get high 
(R. 294:103). Sometime after they met, defendant purchased the truck from Coates 
for $300, but only paid him $1 . .. ucienaai.. ..... :K»; »\an::.
 r .;\ ^ A K a c b 
t i n I M I I I I K I I K ' I I H L I I I n .-jLispCLli'il tin ^ I n n I n im I n n i n g x M , l ( r , | 11 1111 \ ,](), 2(1(14, 
the '* l • ] ireument" concerning the truck at the Smiths and after 
Coates left, defendant said, "He will be taken care of" (R. 293:114-16). Defendant 
also told another mutual friend, Robert Barnes, that "the next time [Coates] leaves 
with m -^, ne s not coming ba^IN
 vi\. _*o.U5). 
1
 Except as otherwise noted, the facts are i eidiedm the light na L , vu..l . . » 
tilt II,I : • j try's verdict. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT "^ ^ 7 ^ P ^d 1106. 
The next evening, on July 27,2004, defendant and Coates were drinking beer 
and socializing in defendant's basement apartment (R. 294:107-08). They began to 
argue again about the truck (R. 293:77; 294:109). Defendant's girlfriend, Jacklyn 
Allred, came home during the argument, and defendant told her to go into the 
bedroom (R. 293:77-78). The argument then became physical as defendant and 
Coates began to push and then to hit each other (R. 293:78-80; 294:112-13). 
Defendant ran into the bedroom and retrieved a metal baseball bat (R. 293:80-81; 
294:113-14). He hit Coates twice in the head with the bat, and Coates fell to the 
ground (R. 294:114). While Coates was on the ground, defendant hit him twice 
more in the head (R. 294:114). At that point, Allred came out of the bedroom and 
saw defendant drop the bat and say, "He's done" (R. 293:82). 
Just then, Robert Barnes and three teenage boys, Steven Nareja, Jesse 
DeMartinez, and Flapp Dahlquist, showed up outside defendant's apartment (R. 
293:86,122,153,168-69; 294:115-16). The boys wanted defendant to buy them some 
beer (R. 293:153,294:116). So defendant left Coates on the kitchen floor and drove 
with Barnes, the boys, and Allred to a grocery store and bought some beer (R. 
293:86,123,154). During the outing, Barnes noticed nothing unusual in defendant's 
behavior (R. 293:124-25). 
4 
The 3 D's: "Drinking, drugs, and dead body disposal 
After purchasing the beer, the boys wanted to drink in defendant's apartment 
(R. 293:88). Defendant initially refused, but the boys threatened to "go drink in 
somebody's front yard and get arrested," so defendant relented and let them in (R. 
293:88). As everybody walked into apartment, they saw Coates on the kitchen floor 
and a pool of blood next to his head (R. 293:89,129,156,172: 294:115). One of the 
boys said, "Whoa, I guess this is what happens when you break into somebody's 
house" (R. 293:129). Defendant had picked up a knife and replied, "Oh, I thought 
you guys was going to get scared, and I was going to have to whack you" (R. 
293:129). He then said, "Don't mind him, he's just sleeping" (R. 193:89,130,157, 
172). Everybody stepped over the body and proceeded into the living room (R. 
293:89,130,157,173). 
The boys and Barnes began drinking, while Allred and defendant started 
cleaning up broken glass and wiping blood off the furniture (R. 293:130,158,160 
174). Defendant also snorted a line of crystal methamphetamine, and Allred 
smoked meth (R. 294:120). Defendant noticed that Allred's dog was licking Coates' 
blood off the kitchen floor, so he decided to move Coates, "so the dog don't go mess 
with him" (R. 294:120). He wrapped Coates in a rug, and Barnes helped him move 
Coates to the bedroom (R. 293:139; 294:120). 
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The group continued drinking, doing drugs, and cleaning until midnight, 
when defendant asked everybody to leave (R. 293:91,135,159,179,294:120). Before 
Barnes left, defendant told him he was going to help dispose of Coates' body (R. 
293:134). Defendant told him, "You're going to help me," and threatened, "You're 
not coming back" (R. 293:134). Barnes refused to help any further and left (R. 
293:137,179-80). As everybody left, they noticed a green pickup truck that was 
backed-up to the entrance of defendant's apartment (R. 293:91,136). 
Defendant was worried that some of his blood might have gotten on Coates 
clothes, so he cut Coates' clothes off, except for his socks and underwear (R. 
294:123). He then loaded Coates' body into the bed of the green pickup truck and 
drove it up to Wasatch County (R. 294:96,122). He pulled over when he found a big 
clearing on the side of a dark road (R. 294:122). Defendant laid Coats' on the side of 
the road and started to cover him in dirt (R. 294:123). Before he could finish, a noise 
spooked him, and he jumped in the truck and drove off (R. 294:123). When 
defendant next saw Allred, he told her that he had taken Coates "camping" (R. 
293:94). 
The investigation and autopsy 
Three days later, a local rancher found Coates' body (R. 293:46-47). It was 
badly decomposed and partially buried in the sand (R. 293:46; 294:8). The police 
secured the scene and processed it for evidence (R. 294:37-38; State's Ex. 1 & 2). 
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C oatt "s h)dv vv ' v nsported to the State Medical Examiner's Office where it was 
autopsied by Dr. Edward Leis (R. 294:7). 
Because the body was badly decomposed, the State had a difficult time 
identifying Coates (K. J. 
C«».-- -K'torminod ho had some bridge work on his teeth, but could not 
take any fingerprints (R. 294:9-10). Instead, he removed the skin from Coates7 left 
hand and amputated Coates' right hand and sent both to the State crime lab for 
fingerprint analysis (R. 294:10 . * • . 11 mc lab w Ub t*L>k IO use the flngerp; in L> V,; ..,. J 
s k i n -. i. t. -t i : • - . - H ' > » > H ) . 
I 'fprmininp f-ho ^ ' Muse of Coates'death (R. 
294:23). He determined that the most extensive injuries were to Coates' head and 
that Coates probably received four separate blows to the head (R. 294:16-19). The 
most significant injury was a "large depressed region on the left forehead area, ' 
approximate!* : , . . . . . . t ;< 
d' p'< : * • • . . : ' . * ' r - 1 -• • '* : iromtion through 
which skull fragments and decomposed brain tissue were protruding (R. 294:16). 
This injury was consistent with a single blow from a metal bat and was likely the 
fatal injury (R. 294:20-21) 
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A second laceration, about an inch-and-a-quarter by half-inch, was found 
above the right eyebrow (R. 294:17). Under that laceration was a hairline fracture in 
the skull (R. 294:17). These injuries were likely caused by a second blow and 
potentially could have been fatal (R. 294:20-21). Two more lacerations were found 
on the side of the left eye and on the left cheek, and three more were located on the 
left ear (R. 294:17). The bones under the left eye and cheek were fractured, as was 
the base of the skull above the eyes and around the left side to just behind the ear (R. 
294:17). These injuries were all caused by a third blow. A fracture to the right side 
of the lower jaw was the fourth blow (R. 294:17). 
As police continued their investigation, they discovered the green truck in 
which defendant had transported Coates (R. 294:27,39^0, 79). The truck actually 
belonged to Coates and was "his pride and joy" (R. 294:60). Defendant had parked 
it around the corner from his apartment and buried the keys in the dirt near an 
adjacent building (R. 293:96-97). Dried blood in the bed of the truck was identified 
as Coates' blood (R. 294:79,94; State's Ex. 35). The police also searched defendant's 
apartment and car (R. 294:28-30). They found Coates' blood spattered on a living 
room wall and the cushions of the couches, including a cushion that was in the 
trunk of defendant's car (R. 294:30,32-33-34,94; State's Ex. 14,16,18-19). 
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The State charged defendant with murder and obstruction of justice (R. 1-9). 
At trial, the State presented testimony from Allred about the murder and testimony 
from Barnes, Allred, Najera, and DeMartmez about defendant's activities after AW 
s.<: • ' * ' T ! J ! ^ i i W 793:141). He also 
testified, with Shelly Smith, that defendant had made threatening statements 
towards Coates a few days before the murder (R. 293:116,148). 
The State also presented evidence from Pr T ei? 'R. 294:5-.. w ik- UL-XUL-LU 
Coates'injuries and the decomposed suu. ^: >.;> .; ia op 
fon^nsirs 11 »rhn iri -. - • l - •  • n the State crime lab also testified about their investigation 
and the findings in Coates' truck and defendant's apartment and car (R. 294:27-61, 
76-94). 
In addition to the crime witnesses and law enforcement personnel, the SUILC 
ca 1Ji111 11 ) 111II I I i ( 1 1 in 11 mi in in 1 1 1 mi in. in i in I I II \ J l I L ) 4 ( 1 7 ' 1 ) I II 1 1 1 mi 1 1 * i > i I  II mi in II in 11 , in i II11 i in i n II \ mi II II i 
defendant ikv <" - jdil after the murder (R. 294:67). Defendant told 
Montano that he had killed Coates and dumped his body in Wasatch County (R. 
294:69). He also bragged that the body would be too decomposed for DNA testing 
and that the police would not get any DNA out of his apartment because uc aad 
s • • 
flooded the toilet and put feces all over everything" (R. 294:70). Defendant never 
told Montano that Coates had attacked him (R. 294:74). 
After the State rested, defendant took the stand (R. 294:139). His testimony 
was largely consistent with the State's evidence, with a few significant differences. 
He claimed that during the fight Coates attacked him with a machete that was 
sitting on the coffee table (R. 294:113). Defendant asserted that he used the coffee 
table as a shield and that Coates struck the coffee table a couple of times with the 
machete (R. 294:113). He also stated that he ran to the kitchen, not the bedroom, to 
retrieve his bat and that he killed Coates in the kitchen (R. 294:113-14). 
Defendant denied making any threatening statements towards Coates before 
killing him (R. 294:107). He also denied holding a knife when everybody entered his 
apartment after going to the grocery store (R. 294:117). 
But defendant admitted striking Coates in the head several times with the bat 
(R. 294:114). He claimed that the first blow to Coates's head knocked him into 
defendant's stove (R. 294:114). Defendant then said, "He came back and I hit him 
again, and went to the ground, and I hit him a couple of times, and he wasn't 
moving" (R. 294:114). He explained that he was acting out of rage and was "just 
panicked out" (R. 294:114). At that point, Coates' "head was all busted open" and 
bleeding onto the kitchen floor (R. 294:115). Defendant put the machete in his 
freezer where the police later found it (R. 294:53,124; State's Ex. 39). 
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Defendant did not deny dumping Coates' body in Wasatch County (R. 
294:122-23). He explained that he did not call an ambulance or alert the police 
because he was not thinking clearly and was afraid of retribution from defendant's 
family (R. 294:129-30). 
The State called one rebuttal witness, Detective Doug Miller, the case manager 
(R. 294:138-39). He explained that during the search of defendant's apartment he 
examined the coffee table and found only small dings (R. 294:139). He did not find 
any marks consistent with a blow from a weapon such as a machete (R. 294:139). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant does not assert any error in the trial court's conduct or rulings. He 
claims only that his counsel was ineffective. 
He first claims that counsel was ineffective for asking a state's witness, Shelly 
Smith, whether she had reported rumors to the police that defendant had allegedly 
murdered three other people. Counsel was not deficient, however, because his 
questions were part of a legitimate strategy to impeach Smith's credibility. 
Moreover, in light of all the evidence presented at trial, the questions and answers 
were not prejudicial to defendant. 
Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting under 
rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, to two photographs of Coates' dead body and to 
statements from the medical examiner about the decomposition of Coates' body. 
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But counsel was not deficient because any objection would have been futile. 
Finally, defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for not moving for a 
directed verdict and not requesting a manslaughter instruction. Counsel was not 
ineffective because there was sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury and 
there is a conceivable strategic reason for not requesting a lesser-included offense 
instruction on manslaughter: to obtain an acquittal. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT PROVIDE 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by (1) 
cross-examining a witness on her claims to police that defendant had murdered 
three other people; (2) not objecting under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence to 
testimony and photographs of Coates' dead body; (3) not moving at the close of the 
State's case in chief for a directed verdict; and (3) not requesting a manslaughter 
instruction. Aplt. Br at 20-50. Defendant claims are meritless. 
A. Defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel 
performed effectively. 
To establish that he did not receive the representation guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment, defendant must prove two elements. First, he must identify the 
specific acts or omissions he claims fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88,690 (1984); Parsons v. 
12 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994). Second "[t]he defendant must show that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different/' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
In proving the first prong of Strickland—that counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness—defendant must rebut "a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial 
strategy/" Strickland 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91,101 
(1955)). This presumption arises from the requirement that "every effort be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's 
perspective at the time." Id. "[Defendant must overcome the strong presumption 
that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance by persuading the court that 
there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 
25, \ 6,89 P.3d 162 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "If the conceivable 
tactical bas[e]s for defense counsel's actions are apparent, [defendant has not 
overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance " State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, % 58, 
61 P.3d 291 (internal quotations and citations omitted, alteration in original); see also 
13 
State v. Parker, 2000 UT 5 1 , 1 11, 4 P.3d 778 (holding first prong of Strickland not 
satisfied because it was conceivable that counsel's conduct was result of a deliberate 
and tactical choice). 
"An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant 
setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the 
judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Thus under the second prong of the 
Strickland analysis, defendant must demonstrate prejudice by showing "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." Id. at 694. In making this determination, the court 
must consider "the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury." Id. at 695. 
"Taking the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due account of the effect of 
the errors on the remaining findings," the court must determine if it is reasonably 
likely that the outcome would have been different. Id. at 696. 
Defendant has failed to satisfy the first prong of Strickland. Each of the 
deficient acts he alleges were, in fact, strategic decisions. Moreover, in light of the 
strength of the State's evidence, the prejudicial impact of counsel's decisions was 
minimal. 
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B. Issue 1: Defense counsel conducted a reasonable cross-
examination of Shelly Smith. 
Defendant first claims that his counsel was ineffective for eliciting evidence 
that a State's witness, Shelly Smith, told the police rumors that defendant had killed 
three other people. This was not deficient performance, however, because counsel's 
questions were a reasonable attempt to impeach Smith by showing that she disliked 
defendant and was spreading baseless rumors about him. 
1. Proceedings Below. 
Shelly Smith testified for the State that defendant had argued with and made 
threatening statements towards Jerry Coates a few days before beating him to death 
with a baseball bat (R. 293:112-16). She also revealed that she was a meth user (R. 
293:116). On cross examination, defense counsel asked her about a conversation she 
had with Detective Miller the month after Coates' murder (R. 293:117-18). The 
transcript of counsel's cross examination of Smith is attached as Addendum A. 
Defense counsel first asked Smith if she remembered speaking to Detective 
Miller in August 2004 and if she remembered that she was high on meth at that time 
(R. 293:117). Smith responded that she remembered the conversation, but could not 
remember if she was on meth at the time (R. 293:117). Counsel then asked her if she 
remembered telling the detective that defendant had killed other people (R. 
293:117). She replied, "That was hearsay to me. Um, I heard that off and on" (R. 
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293:117). Counsel then said, "And you mentioned that to the detective, correct?" (R. 
293:118). 
Counsel then read to her a portion of the interview transcript in which she 
told Detective Miller that she heard that a murder occurred by the railroad tracks (R. 
293:118). He quoted her saying, "And that was at another house. Then he was 
telling me, bragging, this is what I called it, somebody something that he had beat 
the shit out of, and they buried someone by the railroad tracks and warehouse" (R. 
293:118). At that point, the prosecutor stopped defense counsel and they held an 
off-the-record discussion (R. 293:118). 
When cross examination resumed, defense counsel asked Smith whether she 
told Detective Miller that defendant had killed two girls in his residence (R. 
293:118). She replied, "That was something that I had heard, but I—I may have 
mentioned it to him" (R. 293:118). Counsel asked whether she had told the detective 
that "presumably an Adrian and a Jennifer had been killed" and that Jackie Allred 
had told her that (R. 293:118). Smith confirmed, "Yeah. Everybody thought he had 
because they were missing, too" (R. 293:118). Counsel then said, "That's all I have," 
and sat down (R. 293:119). The prosecutor did not ask any follow-up questions (R. 
293:119). 
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2. Defense counsel's strategy to discredit Smith was 
reasonable. 
Defense counsel's cross-examination of Smith has a "conceivable tactical 
basis": to discredit her testimony against defendant. Clark, 2004 UT 25, 1 6 
(emphasis removed). Specifically, counsel demonstrated that Smith was mad at 
defendant and had spread inculpatory rumors and hearsay about him to the police. 
From that evidence, the jury might question Smith's motives for testifying against 
defendant and choose to disbelieve her testimony. 
When defendant testified, he claimed that the Smiths were mad at him. He 
explained that they were going to buy the truck that he had purchased from Coates 
but were unable to because they spent the purchase money on drugs (R. 294:104-
05). So defendant bought the truck instead (R. 294:105). Defendant then explained, 
"[The Smith's] were pretty upset that I had bought the truck, you know, 
undermining them. They took it pretty—it was pretty upsetting for them" (R. 
294:106). 
Defendant's counsel used his cross-examination of Shelley Smith to support 
defendant's claim that she was upset with him. He first asked whether she 
remembered telling Detective Miller that defendant had killed other people (R. 
293:117). When Smith replied that was only hearsay, counsel interjected, "And you 
mentioned that to the detective, correct?" (R. 293:118). Counsel then read into the 
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record Smith's disjointed hearsay report of the supposed murder (R. 293:118). Then, 
after the prosecutor's objection and off-the-record discussion, counsel again 
questioned Smith about reporting to the police rumors that defendant had 
murdered two girls (R. 293:118). 
Counsel thus presented to the jury evidence that Smith was a drug user, was 
angry with defendant, and had spread baseless inculpatory rumors and hearsay 
about him. From that evidence, the jury could impute to Smith a motive to lie and 
conclude that she was therefore not credible. 
Defendant nevertheless claims that his counsel's impeachment strategy 
constituted deficient performance—i.e. no reasonable attorney would use the same 
strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ("The proper measure of attorney 
performance remains reasonableness under prevailing professional norms."). 
He argues that it is ordinarily "unreasonable for defense counsel to affirmatively 
admit evidence of his client's prior crimes." Aplt. Br. at 22. He cites three cases in 
support of this argument: White v. McAninch, 235 F.3d 988, 997-98 (6th Cir. 2000); 
Commonwealth v. Sweitzer, 395 A.2d 1376,1383 (Pa. 1978); State v. Cutcher, 244 N.E.2d 
767, 768-69 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969). 
But defendant's argument, and his cases, are inapposite. Defense counsel did 
not introduce evidence that defendant had murdered other people. He elicited only 
evidence that a State's drug addicted witness had spread rumors based on nothing 
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but hearsay that defendant had murdered other people. As even defendant 
acknowledges, Smith's reports were "highly unreliable." Aplt. Br. at 26. The jury 
certainly understood that she was reporting hearsay and rumor, not fact. Moreover, 
the fact that the prosecutor did not follow up on Smith's reports on redirect 
suggested to the jury that the reports were spurious. Had there been any truth to 
Smith's reports, the State would have inquired about the basis for her reports on 
redirect. 
3. Counsel's strategy did not prejudice defendant. 
In any event, counsel's impeachment strategy did not unfairly prejudice 
defendant. A deficient act by defense counsel prejudices a defendant only when 
there is a reasonable likelihood of an acquittal absent the deficient conduct. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 
In the instant case, there was not prejudice because the State's evidence 
against defendant was overwhelming, and the jury would have convicted him even 
absent rumors that he had killed other people. Defendant did not dispute that he 
killed Coates, nor did he dispute dumping Coates' body on the side of the road in 
Wasatch County. Thus the only question for the jury was whether defendant beat 
Coates to death in self-defense. The evidence at trial proved that he did not. 
Although an argument and a physical altercation preceded the killing, 
defendant told at least two people the day before that he intended to kill Coates (R. 
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293:116,148). Defendant also did not attempt to resuscitate Coates after beating 
him, nor did he summon help. He simply dropped his bat and said, "He's done" (R. 
293:82). He then left Coates bleeding on the kitchen floor while he went to the 
grocery store for beer (R. 293:86, 294:115-16). When he returned, he wrapped 
Coates up in a rug, drove him to Wasatch County, and left him partially buried on 
the side of the road. This evidence demonstrates that defendant wanted Coates to 
die. 
The only evidence of self-defense came from defendant. He claimed that 
Coates attacked him with a machete and that he was only defending himself (R. 
294:113). But the physical evidence did not support defendant's claim. The coffee 
table he allegedly used as a shield bore no machete marks (R. 294:139). 
Moreover, even assuming that defendant's testimony was true—that Coates 
attacked him with a machete—his testimony was ultimately consistent with the 
State's theory that he murdered Coates. He admitted that after Coates was down 
that he struck Coates twice more in the head (R. 294:115,128). This admission was 
confirmed by the medical examiner's opinion that Coates suffered at least four 
separate blows to the head (R. 294:16-19). 
The jury was unlikely to find self-defense when defendant continued to beat 
Coates after knocking him down. The jury's self-defense instruction stated that a 
person could use deadly force "to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself, 
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or a third person, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony" (R. 215). See also 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(1) (West 2004). Once Coates was down, the threat of 
death or injury was abated, there was no justification to continue beating him. This 
fact, combined with defendant's earlier threats, his failure to summon aid, and his 
efforts to conceal Coates' body, proved beyond question that defendant wanted 
Jerry Coates dead and that killing him was not an act of self-defense. Thus, any 
alleged deficiency in his counsel's strategy to impeach Smith was harmless. 
C. Issue 2: Counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to the 
admission of two crime scene photographs and not objecting 
to the medical examiner's description of Coates' decomposed 
body. 
Defendant asserts that his counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the 
admission of two crime-scene photographs depicting Coates' body as it was 
discovered in Wasatch County. Aplt. Br. at 29. He also claims that his counsel was 
ineffective for not objecting to the medical examiner's description of Coates' 
decomposed body. Aplt Br. at 29. He asserts that counsel should have objected to 
the photographs and the description under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Defendant's claim is meritless. Any objection would have been futile because 
the photographs and description were admissible under rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. His counsel therefore made a reasonable strategic decision not to object to 
the photos or the description so that the jury would not view him as obstructive. 
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Moreover, counsel's decision did not prejudice defendant because admission of the 
photographs and description did not alter th( tcome of the trial. 
1. Defense counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to 
object to the photographs or testimony. 
As explained in point A, "[Defendant must overcome the strong 
presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance by persuading the 
court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." Clark, 2004 UT 
25, \ 6 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "If the conceivable tactical 
bas[e]s for defense counsel's actions are apparent, defendant has not overcome the 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assis tance. . ." Holbert, 2002 UT App 426,158 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted, alteration in original). Additionally, "[fjailure to raise futile 
objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Kelley, 2030 
UT 41, \ 26,1 P.3d 546. 
Defense counsel made a clear, informed decision not to object to the 
photographs of Coates' body because they were not objectionable. The State filed a 
motion in limine to admit the photographs into evidence (R. 155-65). At the hearing 
on the motion, defense counsel did not object. Instead, he said, "I reviewed these 
photographs of the scene, and I was going to show them to my client. I don't think 
there would be any objection to them. So we won't object your Honor, to those two 
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photographs" (R. 292:3-4). The Court then asked defense counsel if he agreed that 
the photographs were not unfairly prejudicial (R. 292:4). Counsel agreed, "I do. 
They are not so gruesome as to create prejudice" (R. 292:4). 
During trial, counsel did not object to the photographs. He also did not object 
to the medical examiner's description of Coates' decomposed body. At the end of 
trial, in closing argument, counsel told the jury, "[A]fter you have examined all of 
the evidence, all that we stipulated to—we did not object to any of it because that 
was not a crucial issue that you folks have to determine . . . " (R. 294:153). 
Counsel's decision not to object was reasonable, if not prudent, because any 
objection under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, would have been properly 
overruled, and thus futile. 
Rule 403 states, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. Balancing the 
probative value and the prejudice first requires the court to determine if the 
evidence is relevant. State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, \ 46,52 P.3d 1210. If the evidence is 
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relevant, then the Court must decide whether "the risk of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the probative value of the photograph." Id.2 
Defendant claims that the photographs and evidence were of little 
probative value because "no one contested Coates' identity, that Coates was dead, 
the cause of death, or the condition of Coates' body when it was discovered." Br. 
Aplt. at 31. He asserts the only issue for the jury was defendant's state of mind and 
that, therefore, the only purpose of the photographs and evidence "was to inflame 
and arouse the jury by illustrating in graphic aural and visual detail the depravity 
with which [defendant] treated the body after the altercation." Br. Aplt. at 31. 
2
 In Bluff'the court also considered whether the photographs were gruesome 
and stated that gruesome photographs reverse the presumption—that is, they are 
admissible only if the probative value substantially outweighs the risk of unfair 
prejudice. See Bluff, 2002 UT 66, \ 46. Defendant cites to Bluff and other cases in 
which the defendants claimed that photographs were gruesome. Br. Aplt. at 29-31. 
He also analyses the photographs and testimony using the factors for determining 
gruesomeness. Br. Aplt. at 29. He never claims, however, that the photographs or 
testimony are gruesome or that the presumption of admissibility should be 
reversed. See Br. Aplt. at 28-32. Rather, he cites the standard test for prejudice 
under rule 403—whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Br. Aplt. at 29,32. Thus, this Court 
need not consider gruesomeness and need only determine if the evidence is relevant 
and if it is substantially more prejudicial than probative. As defendant correctly 
points out, however, the factors for determining gruesomeness may also be used for 
balancing probative value and prejudicial effect under rule 403. See Bluff, 2002 UT 
66, \ 53 n.10. 
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But evidence is not less probative merely because the defendant stipulates or 
does not contest certain facts. "[A] stipulation of fact by defense counsel does not 
make evidence less relevant, nor is it a basis for depriving the prosecution the 
opportunity of profiting from the legitimate moral force of its evidence in 
persuading a jury." State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, \ 37,106 P.3d 734 (quotations 
and citations omitted). "The State has the right to prove every essential element of a 
crime in the most convincing manner within the bounds of the rules of evidence and 
fair play." State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452,456 (Utah 1989). 
Here, the photographs and testimony were highly probative of the charge of 
obstructing justice. "An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent 
to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, 
conviction, or punishment of any person regarding conduct that constitutes a 
criminal offense: . . . (c) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other 
thing." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306(1) (West 2004). The photographs and testimony 
are the most probative evidence that defendant concealed and altered Coates' body 
in violation of the statute. 
First, the photographs illustrated how defendant moved Coates' body to the 
side of rural road where it was less likely to be immediately discovered and 
potentially exposed to contamination and degradation by soil, moisture, sunlight, 
animals, and insects (R. State's Ex. No. 1 & 2, attached as Addendum A). The 
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medical examiner's testimony then described the effect upon the State's 
investigation of leaving the body in the open (R. 294:8,10). Coates' body was "fairly 
extensively decomposed" (R. 294:8). The medical examiner had difficulty getting 
fingerprints and identifying a tattoo on Coates' left hand (R. 294:9-10). He also 
could not determine how long Coates had been dead or whether Coates had any 
defensive or offensive bruising injuries (R. 294:13). 
The photographs were also probative of defendant's mental state when he 
killed Coates. Defendant claimed that he killed Coates in self-defense (R. 294:145). 
But leaving Coates' body to decompose on the side of the road, and the effect of that 
decomposition, suggests otherwise to the jury. Had defendant killed Coates in self-
defense, he likely would have sought to protect Coates' body to preserve evidence 
of self-defense such as offensive cuts or bruising on Coates' hands and knuckles. 
Dumping Coates' body in a location where it is likely to be contaminated and to 
decompose suggests a guilty mind. 
While the pictures and testimony were highly probative, they had little 
prejudicial effect. Defendant likens the photographs to the pictures that were ruled 
overly prejudicial in State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979) and State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 
512 (Utah 1968). In Wells, the prosecutor introduced three close-up photographs of a 
bullet wound. 603 P.2d at 812-13. In Poe, the prosecutor introduced color slides of 
the victim's dissected brain cavity. 441 P.2d at 514. 
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In contrast to Wells and Voe, the pictures in the instant case were not close-ups 
and did not display any blood, wounds, or other gore. State's exhibit number one is 
merely a wide-angle shot of the area where Coates' body was found. See 
Addendum B. The body is no bigger than a thumbnail and is barely discernable 
amid the dirt and rocks. State's exhibit number two is a closer shot of Coates7 
partially buried body. Id. But Coates is still only four inches long on a 8x10 inch 
photograph, and no injuries are visible. Id. 
In fact, the photographs are more benign than those admitted in State v. 
Calliham, 2002 UT 87, \ \ 33-41,57 P.3d 220. Calliham contested the admission of six 
color photographs of the victim's body at the crime scene. Id. at \ 39. Some of the 
photographs showed the victim's face, bullet wounds, and small amounts of dark, 
dried blood. Id. The supreme court ruled that the photographs were not 
"inherently prejudicial" and that the risk of unfair prejudice did not outweigh their 
"limited probative value." Id. at \ \ 39-40. By contrast, the photographs of Coates 
do not depict any injuries or blood, nor is his face discernable. 
Likewise, the medical examiner's testimony was not substantially more 
prejudicial than probative. Concededly, some aspects of his testimony were 
unsettling. But it was those aspects that were the most probative. The skin 
discoloration, the maggot and insect activity, the loose skin, and the resulting 
difficulty in identifying Coates' body were the most direct and best evidence that 
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defendant had " alter [ed], destroy [ed], concealfed], or remove[d]" Coates's body 
after killing him. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306(1). Notably, the State never sought to 
introduce photographs of this evidence, but relied solely on Dr. Leis' testimony. 
Defense counsel's decision not to object to testimony of this highly probative 
evidence, which was substantially less prejudicial than autopsy photographs would 
have been, was reasonable. 
2. Defense counsel's decision not to object to the photographs 
and testimony did not prejudice defendant. 
Even if counsel had successfully objected, it would not have altered the 
outcome of defendant's trial. As explained in point B.3, the evidence against 
defendant was overwhelming. Defendant told at least two people that he was going 
to kill Coates (R. 293:116,148). Soon thereafter, he had a physical altercation with 
Coates during which he hit Coates in the head with a baseball bat twice and then 
continued to beat him in the head even after Coates was down (R. 294:114). 
Defendant then left Coates mortally wounded on the floor of his kitchen while he 
went for beer (R. 293:123,154). When he returned, he loaded Coates into the bed of 
a pickup truck and drove him to Wasatch County, where he left his body to 
decompose on the side of the road (R. 294:96,122-23). Such evidence compellingly 
demonstrates that defendant did not kill Coates in self-defense. 
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D. Issue 3: Counsel's decision not to move to dismiss the case for 
insufficient evidence was reasonable, because the evidence 
was sufficient. 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a 
directed verdict for insufficient evidence. Aplt. Br. at 34. To prove his counsel's 
ineffectiveness on this point, defendant must first demonstrate that a directed 
verdict motion would have succeeded. Defendant has not done this. 
As a threshold matter, defendant has failed to properly marshal the evidence. 
To challenge his conviction for insufficient evidence, defendant must first marshal 
the evidence that supports the State's case. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
Marshalling requires him to gather and present, in a light most favorable to the 
State's case, "every scrap of competent evidence... which supports the very findings 
[he] resists," West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 
1991). He must "fully embrac[e] the [State's] position" without "simply rearguing 
and recharacterizing" the evidence. State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, \ 17,124 P.3d 235 
(citations and quotations omitted); see also Heinecke v. Dep't of Commerce, 810 P.2d 
459,464 (Utah App. 1991). Failure to properly marshal the evidence is grounds to 
reject a sufficiency claim. See, e.g., Clark, 2005 UT 75,117; State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 
98, \ 16,989 P.2d 1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991). 
In his summation of the inculpatory facts, defendant fails to include his own 
testimony that he continued beating Coates in the head even after Coates was down 
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(R. 294:114). Aplt. Br. at 34-36. Omission of this critical fact constitutes a failure to 
marshal. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. He also weaves into his summation 
exculpatory facts. For example, defendant properly includes Barnes' testimony that 
he heard defendant threaten to kill Coates, but defendant then states that Barnes 
thought defendant was joking. Br. Aplt. at 35. Defendant also includes Barnes 
testimony that defendant claimed that Alfred's gang member friends killed Coates. 
Br. Aplt. at 35. Because defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence, this 
Court should refuse to consider his sufficiency claim. See Clark, 2005 UT 75, \Y7. 
Even had defendant properly marshaled the evidence, his claim would be 
meritless. A trial court may only grant a motion for a directed verdict if "the State 
fails to produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." State 
v. Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, f 14,122 P.3d 895 (citations and quotations omitted). 
If "the jury acting fairly and reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the judge is required to submit the case to the jury for 
determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant." Id. (citations and 
quotations omitted). 
As explained in point B.3, the evidence was more than sufficient for the jury 
to convict defendant of murder. A person commits murder if he (1) intentionally or 
knowingly causes the death of another; (2) commits an act clearly dangerous to 
human life with the intent to cause serious bodily injury; or (3) creates a grave risk 
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of death to another while exhibiting a depraved indifference to human life. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2) (West 2004). 
Defendant never disputed causing Coates' death, and the evidence at trial 
established each of the alternative mental states for murder. Defendant told at least 
two people that he was going to kill Coates (R. 293:116,148). Soon thereafter he had 
a physical altercation with Coates during which he hit Coates in the head with a 
baseball bat twice and then continued to beat him in the head after he was down (R. 
294:114). Defendant then left Coates at least mortally wounded, if not dead, on the 
floor of his kitchen while he went for beer (R. 293:123,154). When he returned, he 
loaded Coates into the bed of a pickup truck and drove him to Wasatch County, 
where he left his body to decompose on the side of the road (R. 294:96, 122-23). 
Given the strength of the State's case and the low threshold for surviving a directed 
verdict motion, any attempt by defense counsel to dismiss the case at the close of the 
State's evidence would have been futile. State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, % 26,1 P.3d 546 
("Failure to raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel/'). Counsel therefore properly chose not to move for a directed verdict. 
E. Issue 4: Counsel's decision not to ask for a manslaughter 
instruction was sound trial strategy. 
Defendant finally claims that his counsel was ineffective for choosing not to 
ask for a manslaughter instruction. Br. Aplt. at 38. He argues that there was a basis 
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in the evidence for a manslaughter instruction and that counsel's decision not to ask 
for one "forced the jury, if it believed the State's case, to convict [defendant] of 
murder, even though the State did not establish the mens rea for murder, because 
the only other alternative was acquittal." Br. Aplt at 42. Defendant's argument is 
meritless.3 
To prove his counsel was ineffective, defendant must first overcome "the 
strong presumption that under the circumstances the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 19,12 P.3d 92 
(quotations and citations omitted). He must persuade this Court that "there was no 
conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6,89 P.3d 
162 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "If the conceivable tactical bas[e]s 
for defense counsel's actions are apparent, defendant has not overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
3
 Defendant states his counsel "failed to object to the lack of manslaughter 
instruction." Br. Aplt. at 38. Defendant's characterization of his counsel's conduct 
as a failure to object incorrectly suggests that the trial court or the State had a duty 
to include a lesser-included offense instruction on defendant's behalf. "[T]he court 
has no independent duty to give [a lesser-included offense] instruction if not 
requested." State v. Whiteman, 2000 UT App 283,1 8 (unpublished memorandum 
decision). Counsel failed to request a lesser included offense instruction, not object to 
the lack of an instruction. 
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professional assistance " State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, \ 58, 61 P.3d 291 
(internal quotations and citations omitted, alteration in original). 
Defendant's claim that his trial counsel was deficient because he did not 
request a manslaughter instruction is refuted by a conceivable strategic basis for not 
requesting the instruction—to gain acquittal for his client. 
A decision to seek acquittal rather than face the risk of conviction on a lesser-
included offense is a reasonable trial strategy. See, e.g., Colon v. Smith, 723 F.Supp. 
1003, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("A failure to request charges on all possible lesser 
included offenses may be proper strategy."); Benefield v. State, 557 S.E.2d 476, 479 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001) ("Counsel's decision not to request a jury charge on a lesser 
included offense and to pursue an 'all or nothing' defense is a matter of trial strategy 
and does not amount to ineffective assistance."); Miller v. State, 914 So. 2d 800,805 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that Miller's counsel may have believed Miller 
would be acquitted of the greater charge and thus made a calculated decision not to 
pursue the lesser-included offense); State v. Griffie, 658 N.E.2d 764, 765 (Ohio 1996) 
("Failure to request jury instructions on lesser-included offenses is a matter of trial 
strategy and does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.") (citation omitted); 
State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 723 (Utah App. 1997) (holding counsel's decision not to 
request a lesser-included offense instruction consistent with trial strategy and does 
not constitute ineffective assistance); State v. Whiteman, 2000 UT App 283, % 10 
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(unpublished memorandum decision, attached as Addendum D) (holding that 
failure to request a lesser-included offense instruction was a reasonable trial strategy 
and thus not ineffective assistance of counsel). 
Defendant nevertheless argues that his counsel's decision was deficient. But 
he does not point to any evidence that counsel's failure to request a manslaughter 
instruction was the product of inadvertence or carelessness. He merely points out 
that there was a basis in the evidence for a manslaughter instruction. 
Trial counsel's decision not to request a manslaughter instruction "is 
presumed to be the product of a conscious choice or preference." Litherland, 2000 
UT 76, \ 20; see also Strickland 466 U.S. at 689 ("[A] court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance."). Defendant cannot overcome that presumption merely by 
showing that an alternative choice or strategy was available. "There are countless 
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
"Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the 
same way." Id. Thus, defendant can show his counsel was deficient only by 
demonstrating that no reasonable attorney would have submitted defendant's case 
to the jury without a manslaughter instruction. Id. at 688 ("The proper measure of 
attorney performance is simply reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms."). 
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In hindsight, requesting a lesser-included offense instruction in the instant 
case might have saved defendant from a murder conviction. But from counsel's 
perspective at trial, it risked preventing an acquittal. "Submission of lesser included 
offenses may give a jury a basis for finding a defendant guilty of a crime where the 
prosecution was unable to prove the elements of the original crime charged beyond 
a reasonable doubt." Colon, 723 F. Supp. at 1008; see also Miller, 914 So.2d at 805 ("It 
is possible that Miller's counsel believed Miller would be acquitted of the greater 
charge but convicted of the lesser offense, and made a calculated decision not to 
pursue the lesser included offense instruction."). Thus, counsel might conceivably 
have chosen to forego a manslaughter instruction in order to secure an acquittal for 
his client. In fact, defendant may have told his counsel not to ask for a 
manslaughter instruction. Defendant has presented no evidence to refute this 
conceivable trial strategy. Thus his claim fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted June 12,2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Were they friends of the Defendant? 
Yes. 
MR. BURMESTER: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Is there anything further, Mr. Chacon? 
MR. CHACON: No. 
THE COURT: Ms. Allred, you may step down. You're 
go. Thank you. 
Should we take a recess folks? If you would like to 




(Jurors indicate in the negative.) 1 
THE COURT: Okay. If anybody needs to go on a 
raise your hand. 
Call your next witness. 
MR. HARMS: Shelly Smith, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
SHELLY SMITH 
Called by the State, having been duly 
Sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God' p 1 























THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: If you'll be seated here please, ma'am. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
HARMS: 
Would you state your full name, please. 
Shelly Ann Smith. 
Ms. Smith, this trial is being recorded by a court 
r, but the acoustics are such in this courtroom that if 
't speak into that microphone, she can't hear you. 1 
Okay. 1 
So can you speak up and speak into that? 1 
Shelly Ann Smith. 
And you live in Salt Lake City? 1 
Yes, I do. 1 
Do you know a person by the name of Robin Kaaloa? 
Yes, I do. 
How do you know him? I 
I met him through some other friends. J 
How long have you known him? I 
Now, it's probably been about a year and a half. 
All right. And you knew him in June, July and August 
9 1 
Yes, I did. 
Did you see the person known to you as Robin Kaaloa 
courtroom? 
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A. Yes, I do. He's right over there. 
Q. What's he wearing? 
A. He's right over there. 
Q. And what is he wearing? 
A. He's wearing a maroon shirt. 
MR. HARMS: May the record reflect the identification 
of the defendant? 
THE COURT': Yes, it did may. 
Q. (BY MR. HARMS) Now, did you know a person named Jerry 
Coates? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. How long have you known Jerry Coates? 
A. Twenty-seven years. 
Q. How did you meet Jerry Coates? 
A. I met him through a girlfriend. He was the boyfriend 
of a girlfriend that I knew back then. 
Q. And you remained friends throughout that 27 years? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. Were you still friends in June and July of 2004? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. I want to call your attention to July of 2004 and ask 
you whether or not you recall Mr. Kaaloa and Mr. Coates being 
together at your home in July of 2004? 
A. Yes, they were. 
Q. And about when in the month was it? 
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A. About the 26th, 27th of July. 
Q. Okay. Do you think it was then or do you think it 
might have been a little bit earlier? 
A. I'm pretty sure it was then, because it was the day 
we had to be here in court on another situation, and I remember 
the 26th and the 27th. 
Q. Now, who else was present at your home at that time? 
A. Urn, I'm remembering my husband was there. 
Q. What's his name? 
A. Roger Smith. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And Jacklyn, I don't know her last name. 
Q. Was that the blond woman who was living with Robin at 
the time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Jacklyn Allred? 
A. I think that was her last name. 
Q. Okay. Anybody else? 
A. I don't remember anybody else, sir. 
Q. During that time period, did you observe a discussion 
between Mr. Kaaloa and Mr. Coates? 
A. Yeah. Jerry showed up, and it had only been a few 
minutes, and Jerry asked Robin where his ten dollars was. And 
Robin stood up, and they were going to fight, and I don't 
remember which one of them ripped off their shirt, and I made a 





about "This is bullshit." 
Robin says, "Let's take this outside." They 
and then I made a comment 
beat him up out there, so 




husband that he's 
can outside. 
the persons arguing 






And did you observe them fight 




was a heated argument. 
was pulled off, and then it was taken outside. 










Did you follow them outside? 
I did not. I stayed inside. My husband and 
side. 
Did Mr. Kaaloa then come 
Yes, he came back in. 
Was Mr. Coates with him? 
No. 
back : 
About how much time had elapse 
Mr. Kaaloa and Mr. Coates left your home 




It was only maybe two or three 
What did Mr. Kaaloa do when he 
Into your home 




to the time that 
minutes. 
came back in ; /our 
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A. He sat down on the couch. 
Q. Did he say anything about Mr. Coates? 
A. What was said first was I said, "This is bullshit." 
And he said, "He will be taken care of." 
Q. And when he said, "He will be taken care of," who was 
he talking about? 
A. He didn't mention a name. He just said, "He will be 
taken care of." 
Q. When you were talking to Mr. Kaaloa, who were you 
talking about? 
A. I was just talking about bullshit, the whole thing 
going on in my house. 
Q. About Mr. Kaaloa and Mr. Coatesfs fighting? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, its been testified that Mr. Kaaloa and 
Ms. Allred would c s to your house to use drugs. Have you 
used drugs in the past? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. What kind of drugs did you use in the past? 
A. Methamphetamine. 
Q. How long has it been since you used methamphetamine? 
A. It's been six or seven months ago. 
Q. Okay. And have you used it today? 
A. No. 
MR. HARMS: Your Honor, may I have a moment? 
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No further questions. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
Any cross-examination, Mr. Chacon. 
MR. CHACON: Yes. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHACON: 
Q. Ms. Smith, do you recall being interviewed by agent 
Doug Miller on August 2004 regarding this particular case? 
A. We had quite a few interviews about this case. 
Q. This would have been the interview that took place at 
the Smith's grocery store at about 12th West and 600 North? 
A. Yeah, yeah I remember that one. 
Q. At that time had you smoked methamphetamine? Do you 
recall being under the influence of methamphetamine? 
A. That day, I donft remember. 
Q. Okay. And do you recall a conversation about 
Mr. Kaaloa supposedly having killed other people? 
A. That was hearsay to me. Urn, I heard that off and on. 
Q. And you mentioned that to the detective; correct? 
A. To tell you the truth, I donft remember if I said 
anything like that at all. 
Q. Let me give you a little background about the 
exchange between you and the detective and see if that 
refreshes your memory. 
A. Okay. 
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Q. It was about you indicating that supposedly there had 
been a murder right by the railroad tracks and the warehouse, 
and that they had got some drugs. 
And Detective Miller says, "Okay." 
And you responded: "And that was at another house. 
Then he was telling me, bragging, this is what I called it, 
somebody something that he had beat the shit out of, and they 
had buried someone by the railroad tracks and warehouse." 
MR. HARMS: Your Honor, I'm going to object before 
she answers and ask for a moment to discuss with Mr. Chacon 
something. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
(Off-the-record discussion.) 
MR. HARMS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q. (BY MR. CHACON) And then do you recall further 
conversation with Detective Miller about two other girls having 
been killed in Mr. Kaaloa's residence? 
A. That was something that I had heard, but I — I may 
have mentioned it to him. 
Q. Okay. That presumably an Adrian and a Jennifer had 
been killed? 
A. Yeah. Everybody thought he had because they were 
missing, too. 
Q. And Jackie Allred told you that? 
A. Yes, I remember that conversation. 
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MR. CHACON: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: All right. Is there anything further? 
MR. HARMS: No, Your Honor, may she be excused? 
THE COURT: Yes. Ms. Smith, you may step down, and 
you're free to go. Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Call your next witness. 
MR. BURMESTER: Robert Barnes. 
ROBERT BARNES 
Called by the State, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: You may be seated here, sir. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BURMESTER: 
Q. Good afternoon, Robert. 
A. Good afternoon. 
Q. Will you please give us your full name, and spell 
your last name. 
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A. I!m Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for the State of 
Utah. 
Q. How long have you been a medical examiner for the 
State of Utah? 
A. Since July of 1999. 
Q. When did you obtain your medical license? 
A. In 1984 from the University of Kansas School of 
Medicine. 
Q. Following your graduation of obtaining your medical 
degree, what other training did you undergo to obtain your 
position as a medical examiner? 
A. I did a four year residency in anatomical clinical 
study at the University of Kansas School of Medicine. 
Completing that in !88, I then came to Salt Lake City and did a 
year of subspecialty training in forensic pathology, completing 
that in f89. I then took a position as an assistant medical 
examiner from the State of Florida, held that for one year, and 
then had the opportunity to return to Salt Lake, and I've been 
here since 1990. 
Q. As part of your dues at the medical examiner's office 
do you routinely perform autopsies for postmortem medical 
examinations? 
A. Yes. 
Q. About how often do you do those? 
A. About every third day. 
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the body? 
A. It was fairly extensively decomposed. There was a 
lot of drying and blackening of the head, and the remainder of 
the body had a green-black discolorations, the slipping of the 
skin, and there was also a lot of maggot activity on the body. 
Q. As part of your examination, did you examine the body 
externally before you did anything pathologically? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And tell me about your external examination of the 
body. 
A. Well, the first thing is the body only had underpants 
and socks on, so we removed those and photographed those for 
evidence purposes. Then we do an external examination of the 
body from head to toe, front and back, looking for any signs of 
injury or documenting any distinguishing features. There were 
injuries on the head noted. There was a laceration on the 
right elbow. There was a linear abrasion on the left forearm 
near the elbow. There were some tattoos on the body. On the 
thighs there were some skin slippage and discoloration 
secondary to decomposition. These were not traumatic injuries. 
There was some small abrasions on the right knee, and some 
abrasions on the left shin. 
Q. How much did the body weigh? 
A. He weighed in at 125 pounds. 
Q. And how tall was he? 
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A. 70.5 inches, so that would be about 5 feet 10 and a 
half. 
Q. Any idea as to age? 
A. My estimate at the time was that he was in his late 
30!s or early 40 T s. 
Q. Any evidence of needle puncture sites or things of 
that nature? 
A. Not that I could tell given the state of the body. 
Q. Any evidence of scars that had healed? 
A. No. 
Q. Let's talk about the tattoos for a moment. What are 
the tattoos that you observed, and where did you observe them 
on the body? 
A. On the right upper arm there was a tattoo of two 
hearts and a banner, and two names. One appeared to be Derek, 
and the other one looked like it read Shamra. 
On the back of the left forearm, there was a tattoo 
of a butterfly. And on the webbing of his left hand was a 
number, it looked to be either 851 or 857. 
Q. Any other identifying marks or identifying features 
of the body at that point? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you note during your internal examination later 
some bridge work? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And describe that bridge work for the jury, please. 
A. As I recall, it was just an upper piece of bridge 
work. I don't remember anything too specific about it. 
Q. Now, as part of the examination, you attempt to 
identify or do something to identify the person who was 
deceased? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you do? 
A* Well, the tattoos help give an initial idea. We try 
to do fingerprints as well. In this particular case, with 
decomposition, to actually do fingerprints at that time is 
difficult. On his left hand, because the decomposition, the 
skin of his hand and finger had pretty much separated from the 
underlining tissue, and we were basically able to peel it off 
just like a glove and submit that to the crime lab so they 
could do fingerprint identification. 
his right hand, there was lots of drying of the skin, 
which would, at that condition, would be inadequate for 
fingerprints, so we simply amputated his hand at the wrist, and 
submitted that to the crime lab and they could undergo steps to 
rehydrate the tissue to try to obtain fingerprints. 
Q. Did you take any blood samples from the body? 
A. Yes. 
MR. HARMS: Your Honor, if I could approach? 
THE COURT: You may. 
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Q. (BY MR. HARMS) Ifm going to hand you what has been 
marked as State's Exhibit No. 30, and inside is State's Exhibit 
No. 30A. Would you identify State's Exhibit 30 and State's 
Exhibit 30A, please? 
A. This seems to be three tubes of blood that we 
obtained from the body. Each tube has the medical examiner's 
label on it as well as my initials. 
Q. And you gave those to Rob Jack of the Department of 
Public Safety? 
A. At the time, actually, Doug Miller signed for those 
samples. 
Q. So you gave those to Doug Miller for transport to the 
state crime lab? 
A. Yes. 
MR. HARMS: Move to admit State's 30 and 30A. 
MR. CHACON: No objection. 
THE COURT: It's received. 
(State's Exhibit Nos. 30 and 30A 
were received into evidence.) 
Q. (BY MR. HARMS) At some point during your examination 
or after your examination, did you also obtain swabs from the 
decedent's body? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What's the purpose of swabbing the body? 
A. We can look for any foreign material or for DNA or 
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find DNA from that particular individual for identification. 
Q. And swabbing the body is, in fact, a method of 
obtaining tissue samples that might lead to DNA profile? 
A. Yes. 
MR. HARMS: May I approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. (BY MR. HARMS) I'm going approach with what's been 
marked as State's 31B, do you recognize that? 
A. Yes. This is an envelope. It has packages of swabs 
in, and it has the medical examiner's label on it as well as my 
signature. 
Q. And that was later identified as the decedent Jerry 
Coates? 
A. ThatTs correct. 
Q. What did you do with the swabs after you signed 
those? 
A. Yes. Those were turned over to Rob Jack. 
Q. Of the Department of Public Safety? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you anticipated those to be transported to the 
Utah State Crime Lab as well. 
A. Correct. 
Q. Anything significant about the external examination 
prior to your actual medical examination? 
A. I gues we'll go into detail of the injuries later. 
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Q. Sure, but you observed injuries, did you not? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Superficially, what injuries did you observe when you 
initially saw the body? 
A. The significant injuries were limited to the head, 
particularly on the left temple region, some on the right 
forehead, the left cheek, and the left ear. 
Q. So did you then conduct an internal examination? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there anything significant as to either identity 
or cause of death or manner of death that you discovered during 
your internal examination? 
A. Just additional findings associated with the head 
trauma that he had sustained. In addition to that, the only 
sign of any significant natural disease was some blockage of 
one of the main blood vessels that supplies blood to his heart. 
Q. Did you eventually determine that had anything to do 
with his actually immediate cause of death, or actual cause of 
death? 
A. It would not. 
Q. All right. At the time that you obtained and 
performed your examination, was there any way to tell how long 
Mr. Coates had been deceased? 
A. I would say no in this particular case, because of 
the state of decomposition. The longer the time frame that 
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passes to come up with any reasonable estimate for time of 
death becomes much more difficult. 
Q. Did you, in your examination, learn anything that led 
you to believe, or observed anything that led you to believe it 
had been some time greater than 12 to 24 hours? 
A. Just in the information that I had from — provided 
by our investigator as to what time the body was discovered, 
and then what time the body was actually received in our 
office. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. HARMS: May I approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q. (BY MR. HARMS) I'm going approach with what's 
previously marked and admitted as State's Exhibit No. 2. That 
depicts the place where he was found. Was that -- was there a 
marked difference between the state of the deceased when you 
received the body and that as depicted in that photograph? 
A. Yes, there is. 
Q. And what would the differences have been? 
A. In this particular photo, the body looks as if it 
hasn't decomposed too extensively. There is some discoloring 
of the skin, but not nearly as pronounced as when I did my 
examination. 
Q. What explains the difference? 
A. Just the time interval, further time interval while 
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the body is transported to our office. ITm not sure what the 
temperature conditions were, and that would have accelerated 
decomposition. 
Q. In that photograph, State's 2, the head of the body 
is markedly a different color than the remainder of the body. 
Can you explain, based on your examination and observations, 
why that would be? 
A. We tend to see decomposition to become more striking 
in the head area as opposed to the rest of the body in 
individuals that die under any type of circumstances but go on 
to decompose. And also an injury would exacerbate that 
condition because the open wounds' exposure to additional 
bacteria. 
Q. As you examined the body externally, did you observe 
any injuries that could be defensive wounds about the torso, 
arms, hand, or wrists? 
A. Defensive injuries that I would be looking for are 
either bruising on the hands or forearms, if they're trying to 
block something. In this particular case, because of the 
decomposition, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, 
so I didn't recognize anything that I would consider defensive 
injuries. 
As far as seeing any open-type wounds as far as 
lacerations of blocking a blow or being cut with something, I 
didn't see anything like that. 
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1 Q. Any fractures of the bones, the arms, or the wrists? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Did you see anything that looked like an offensive 
4 wound, something that might have been caused by being the 
5 aggressor in a dispute or fight? 
6 A. Again, in that type of situation, I would be looking 
7 for bruising on the back of the hands, possibly from throwing a 
8 punch, or sometimes you can inflict cuts upon yourself if 
9 you're holding a sharp object. Again, I didn't see any offense 
10 cuts, and it was difficult to interrupt whether or not there 
11 were bruises in those areas. 
12 Q. Let's talk about the actual traumatic injuries that 
13 you observed. One by one, why don't you describe those for the 
14 jury. 
15 A. Probably the most significant injury is the large 
16 depressed region on the left forehead area. The overall 
17 depression was about five by three inches in size. In this 
18 particular area, the skin was depressed, the underlying bone 
19 was depressed; and fairly centrally located within that there 
20 was also a laceration or a tear in the skin, and that was about 
21 one and three-quarter inches by three-quarters of an inch in 
22 size. 
23 Through that laceration, there were fragments of 
24 skull protruding. There was also some decomposed brain tissue 
25 coming through that particular area as well. Because it was an 
I 
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open injury, there was a lot of insect activity as well. 
Q. Any other injuries on the ahead? 
A. Yes. Above the right eyebrow was another laceration. 
It was about an inch and a quarter by a half inch in size. It 
involved the full thickness of the scalp. There was no 
depressed-skull fracture in that area, but a hairline fracture 
or an actual crack in the bone without a lot of deformity was 
also noted and associated with that. 
He had another laceration to the side of his left 
eye. There was another laceration on his left cheek, and there 
were three different lacerations involving his left ear. 
Q. Any other fractures that you noted on the head area? 
A. The nose appeared to be intact, but there was a — 
when you felt the bones to the side of his eye and also on his 
left cheek, you could tell there was fractures of the 
underlining boney structures of that area. 
Q. And any jaw fractures? 
A. Yes. Later we identified that there was a fracture 
on the right side of the lower jaw. 
MR. HARMS: Your Honor, could I approach? I'm going 
to have Dr. Leis diagram for the jury. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Q. (BY MR. HARMS) Dr. Leis, if you could approach this 
diagram that has been placed in the well of the court marked as 
State's Exhibit No. 37, that diagram, as it sits, is that 
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sufficient for you to diagram the injuries that you observed in 
the medical examination that you performed. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you use the marker -- there was one here. 
MR. BURMESTER: Here's one here. 
Q. (BY MR. HARMS) It was stolen by co-counsel. 
Using this marker, will you diagram the injuries that 
you observed during your medical examination? 
A. Yes. You need to keep in mind this will not be done 
to scale, but this is a rough approximation. 
The area that was depressed was located on the left 
forehead, the left temple region, and it had an area laceration 
that was fairly centrally located. 
Another laceration was located above the right 
eyebrow. A curve laceration to the side of the left eye. 
Another laceration on the cheek, and then three 
lacerations of the ear on towards the top curvature, and that 
was about an inch in total length, one that was about one and 
three-quarter inches in length. It was pretty much vertically 
on the back portion of the ear. 
And above the ear lobe was a V-shaped laceration, 
which each arm was about a half of an inch in length. 
Q. (BY MR. HARMS) And then the jaw fracture, where was 
that? If you could just kind of draw a small line to show the 
jaw fracture. 
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A. It was to the right of the midline. 
Q. Did you ever, during your examination of the 
decedent, did you determine whether or not there were any other 
base-skull fractures? 
A. Yes. After doing the internal examination of the 
head and removing the brain tissue on the base of the skull, 
there were several fractures. Most of these fractures were on 
the thin bones that are located just above the eyes; and on the 
left side, it extended the front of the skull, across the base 
of the skull, probably just a little bit posterior to the ear. 
Q. Anything else that was that you observed as traumatic 
injuries to the head of Mr. Coates during your examination? 
A. No. 
Q. And as currently drawn, does State's Exhibit No. 37 
fairly and accurately represent the traumatic injuries you 
observed during your medical examination? 
A. Yes. 
MR. HARMS: Wefd move to admit State's 37. 
MR. CHACON: No objection. 
THE COURT: Thirty-seven is received. 
(Staters Exhibit No. 31 
Was received into evidence.) 
Q. (BY MR. HARMS) All right. You can return to your 
seat now, thank you. 
Did you determine the shape of any of the depressions 
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of skull fracture, specifically the one above the left temple, 
the left temporal fracture, what was the shape of that? 
A. Urn, at the top, so if you were looking at a clock 
face, from about 10:00 extending to about 2:00, it was a fairly 
sharp curved outline. 
Q. Could it be consistent with a metal bat? 
A. It could be. 
Q. The depression of that fracture, was that 
significant? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were any of these fractures or injuries that you 
observed lethal or fatal? 
A. Well, the one to the left forehead, left temporal 
region is definitely the fatal injury in this case. The other 
laceration, say, to the cheek or the right forehead could 
potentially be lethal. I mean, there is force applied because 
it splits the skin and it fractures the skull on the right 
forehead. That blow in and of itself, how much damage it could 
have caused to the brain potentially could cause enough injury 
that the brain would swell and ultimately lead to death, but 
there's always that potential. 
Q. Is it possible that either — that both of those 
forehead injuries, the major fracture and the lesser fracture, 
could have been caused by the same blow? 
A. Yes, that's possible. 
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Q. Is it likely to have been caused by the same blow? 
A. I would say not likely. 
Q. Based on your examination of Mr. Coates1 skull at the 
time of the autopsy, was his death caused as a result of a 
single blow or multiple blows? 
A. It!s going to be — multiple blows were inflicted. 
Q. What do you base that opinion on? 
A. Well, because we have a depressed skull fracture in 
this area, and that blow is going to have to pretty much be 
perpendicular to the head. It's not going to be a glancing 
blow. So this left forehead injury is one blow. So the right 
forehead would be a second blow. The lacerations to the ear 
and cheek most likely are a third injury, and then the fracture 
to the jaw a fourth injury. It could be fewer, but most likely 
up to four separate blows. 
Q. Do you have an opinion whether or not those injuries 
would have been caused by intentional activities? 
A. Definitely. The depressed skull fracture would be. 
Q. Did you perform or order toxicology tests on the body 
of Mr. Coates? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were the significance of those toxicology tests? 
A. We found the alcohol level in his system measured 
0.17, which would be about twice the legal limit of 
intoxication in Utah. However, some of this elevation could be 
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the result of decomposition as well, and so his alcohol level 
at the time of death was no higher than .17, but could have 
been less. 
Q. Okay. Any narcotics discovered during that 
toxicology report? 
A. Also in his system we identified both cocaine and 
methamphetamine. 
Q. And the cocaine, how was that found, or in what was 
that located? 
A, We did not identify it in the blood sample from the 
chest, but it was present in the urine, which would indicate 
that he had at least used cocaine within 12 hours of his death. 
Q. And the methamphetamine, cr the amphetamine, I guess. 
A. In comparing those two, I would say that the 
methamphetamine is positive, the amphetamine is negative, and 
that should be a fairly recent ingestion or use prior to the 
time of his death. 
Q. Did blows to the head, when he received those, would 
either of those or both of those have immediately incapacitated 
him upon receipt? 
A. The blow to the left head that produced the left 
skull fracture should render him unconscious right after 
sustaining that. 
Q. And did you determine what caused Mr. Coates's death? 
A. I certified the cause of death as blunt force 
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injuries to the head. 
Q. And a blunt force trauma such as that you observed in 
Mr. Coates during your examination, how does that — how does 
the depressed skull fracture cause death in Mr. Coates, in an 
individual? 
A. First off, you've got injuries transferred from the 
blow directly to the brain, so that in and of itself would be 
enough to cause at least a concussive-type of injury, which 
could short circuit the brain right there and cause death to 
occur. 
Because you have fractures of the skull, damage to 
the brain tissue itself, it should cause bleeding inside of the 
ahead, either on the surface of the brain, or to the exterior 
of the brain. However, that was difficult to evaluate given 
the state of decomposition of the brain tissue. 
Q. Did you determine, in addition to the cause of death, 
the manner of death? 
A. Yes. I certified the manner of death as homicide. 
MR. HARMS: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Very well. You may cross, Mr. Chacon. 
MR. CHACON: Thank you, Judge. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHACON: 
Q. Dr. Leis, are the ear and jaw injuries that you have 
described, could those be consistent with a fist fight? Were 
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they such that they could have occurred during a fist fight? 
A. ITd say potentially possible. I would expect that, 
especially with the jaw fracture, that whoever inflicted that 
injury, may show some signs of injury to their own hand, unless 
they had something on their hands, such as a large ring or 
something, that would also make it more likely. 
Q. You said the blood alcohol was .17, which is legally 
drunk in Utah; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Thank you. 
MR. CHACON: Thank you, Judge, that's all. 
THE COURT: All right. If there's nothing further, 
you may step down, Doctor, and you're free to go. Thank you. 
MR. HARMS: Your Honor, may I retrieve the exhibits 
that have been admitted and hold them? 
THE COURT: Yes. I don't believe you offered 31B. 
MR. BURMESTER: We will do it through a different 
witness, Your Honor --
THE COURT: Very well. 
MR. BURMESTER: — and we'll wrap up that exhibit. 
Your Honor, I believe we've reached a stipulation — 
THE COURT: Thank you, Doctor. 
MR. BURMESTER: — with respect to the testimony of 
Detective Robert Jack, that he's a detective with the 
Department of Public Safety, State of Utah; that he was working 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his murder conviction. We affirm. 
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. "[W]e review 
the decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial only for abuse of discretion." State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11 ,H8, 994 
P.2d 1237. To be afforded a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, defendant "must demonstrate from the 
proffered evidence that: '(i) it could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at trial; (ii) it is not 
merely cumulative; and (iii) it must make a different result probable on retrial.'" idL at 1)16 (quoting State v. Martin. 1999 UT 
72,115, 984 P.2d 975). 
First, defendant claims to have discovered new evidence of the victim's gang membership. The trial court determined that 
even had the tattoos allegedly identifying the victim as a gang member been discovered and disclosed prior to trial, the 
jury's verdict would not have been different. We agree. The defendant himself testified regarding the violent, well-
organized groups of Hispanic drug dealers who controlled the drug trade in the park. Other witnesses testified that the 
drug dealers worked in groups and carried weapons, and that they engaged in violence to protect their territory. Further, 
there is no evidence that the defendant was aware of either the tattoos or the particular gang affiliation they represented 
at the time of the homicide and thus this evidence was not particularly probative of his state of mind. We therefore agree 
with the trial court that evidence of the tattoos would not have made a different result probable. 
Defendant also claims to have uncovered additional eyewitness testimony. The trial court found Julian Valdez's testimony 
cumulative, lacking in credibility, and to be of little material value to defendant because much of it supported the State's 
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case. The court found the alleged statements of Gilmar Pinelo to be inadmissible hearsay. While Valdez did testify 
regarding the victim's violence, that evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence presented at trial. See Loose, 2000 
UT 11 at 1]16. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to grant a new trial based on the proffered testimony of 
Valdez and Pinelo. 
Defendant also claims new evidence exists that the State waived payment of an additional $300 fine resulting from a DUI 
charge against witness Robert Young in exchange for Young's testimony. We agree with the trial court that the 
presentation of Young's failure to pay the fine would not have made a different result probable on retrial. 
Next, defendant argues the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. 
Although defendant claims he submitted a requested instruction on manslaughter, our review of the record has uncovered 
no such request. The trial court found that defendant would have been entitled to the instruction if he had requested it, but 
he did not. Moreover, the trial court found, and our review of the record confirms, that his attorneys made no objection to 
the instructions as given. "Where no grounds are apparent from the text of the instruction and no objection is stated, the 
objection is presumed waived." State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, "error may be 
assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); see State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 
688, 700 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (stating that "[bjecause defendant failed to object to the instruction at trial, we can reach 
the issue only to avoid manifest injustice"); cf. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998) (stating that "[w]hen 
reviewing a claim of manifest injustice, we generally use the same standard that is applied to determine whether plain 
error exists"). 
In this case the record indicates that defendant considered requesting a manslaughter instruction, but decided against it. 
The trial court found this to be "appropriate trial tactics, and a reasonable gamble." 
Because we agree with the trial court that the failure to request the manslaughter instruction was deliberate trial strategy, 
rather than egregious oversight, we conclude defendant has not demonstrated obvious error or manifest injustice. It is 
long settled that a defendant has a choice whether to seek a lesser-included instruction, and the court has no independent 
duty to give such an instruction if not requested. See State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 1992); State v. Mitchell, 278 
P.2d 618, 621 (Utah 1955). Indeed, were we to find this strategic choice to fall under the plain error or manifest injustice 
doctrines, defendants in all cases could gamble that the jury would acquit, then appeal the failure to instruct as a manifest 
injustice should they lose. See Howell, 649 P.2d at 94; State v. Valdez, 432 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1967) (noting that "[h]aving 
made his choice, [defendant] is bound by it; and he cannot thus elect to make no request as to a lesser included offense, 
with a reservation in mind that if he is convicted he can claim error and obtain a new trial"). Accordingly, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial based on the failure to give a manslaughter instruction. 
Third, defendant claims his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because counsel failed to fully investigate the 
victim's gang involvement, the additional eyewitness testimony, and the alleged leniency to witness Young. To prevail on 
this claim, defendant "must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable conduct 
and that he was prejudiced thereby." Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153,1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Because we have 
determined that defendant would not have obtained a more favorable result in a new trial including this evidence, we 
conclude defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's treatment of these issues. 
Defendant also claims ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to request a lesser-included offense 
instruction on manslaughter. As discussed above, this failure to request the instruction was a reasonable trial strategy and 
does not constitute ineffective assistance. See State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232,1241 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Similarly, 
counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence of defendant's possible mental illness was a reasonable strategy given the 
defense theory of self-defense. See id. 
Next, defendant claims the State failed to provide him with exculpatory evidence, resulting in a violation of due process. 
Defendant must show that the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence favorable to the defense and that there is "a 
'reasonable probability' that the result . . . would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed." State v. Bakalov, 
1999 UT 45,H39, 979 P.2d 799 (quoting United States v. Bagley. 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). However, we have 
determined above that even had this evidence been presented, a different result on retrial would not be probable. 
Therefore, defendant has failed to show his due process rights were violated. 
Finally, defendant claims there was insufficient evidence of his intent to kill the victim. To prevail in his challenge, 
defendant "must first marshal all the evidence supporting the . . . verdict and then demonstrate how this evidence, even 
viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to support the verdict." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). Defendant has failed to meet his burden to marshal the evidence and instead recites only selected evidence 
supporting his theory of self-defense. Thus, we need not consider whether the evidence was insufficient. See State v. 
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Hopkins. 1999 UT 98,1)16, 989 P.2d 1065. Moreover, our independent review of the record indicates that the jury did hear 
sufficient evidence upon which to base its guilty verdict. For example, witnesses testified that defendant retrieved his knife 
from storage on the morning of the stabbing in order to take care of a "problem" and that when defendant raised the knife 
after being hit by the victim, the victim backed away with his empty hands raised while defendant took several steps 
forward to stab him in the chest. This evidence is sufficient to support the verdict; therefore, defendant's challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence fails. 
Accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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